Yevamos, Chapter Ten, Mishnah 1. This mishnah deals with the law of a woman whose husband traveled to a distant place, and witnesses came and testified that he had died, and she remarried on the strength of that testimony - and in the end it turned out that her husband was alive.
The text of the mishnah:
"HaIshah shehalach ba'alah lim'dinas hayam, uva'u v'amru lah meis ba'alech, v'niseis, v'achar kach ba ba'alah" - a woman whose husband traveled overseas, and they came and told her that he had died, and she remarried on that basis, and afterward her husband returned and it turned out that he had never died at all.
The Gemara explains that the opening of the mishnah, unlike its conclusion, deals with a case in which only one witness came. Although it says "they came and told her," in practice this is the testimony of a single witness; on the basis of that testimony the woman investigated, relied on it with confidence and remarried - and then the husband appeared. The question, then, is what her status is.
The consequences of the ruling - "Teitzei mizeh umizeh":
"Teitzei mizeh umizeh" - she must leave both husbands. From the second certainly, since she was married to the first and the relationship with the second was a forbidden one; and from the first as well she cannot remain married.
"Utzrichah get mizeh umizeh" - she is not permitted to marry a third man until she receives a get from both of them. From the first - a get by Torah law, since she was genuinely married to him; and from the second - a rabbinic decree, lest people err and think that she had been divorced from the first and married the second lawfully. That is not the reality, but that is how people are liable to think, and therefore the Sages required a get from him as well.
"V'ein lah kesubah" - she does not collect her kesubah the way a divorcee collects hers. All of these are penalties, since we relied on her own investigation, and because of their severity she will investigate with the utmost care.
"V'lo peiros" - she does not collect the value of the produce that the second husband consumed from her melog property unlawfully, even though he was not truly married to her.
"V'lo mezonos" - even if she borrowed money and lived off it for her support, and even before she married the second man, she does not collect this from her first husband.
"V'lo b'la'os" - whatever the second husband wore out of her melog property she does not collect. She takes only what still exists intact, but the depreciation caused by use she does not collect.
"Lo al zeh v'lo al zeh" - none of these does she collect, not only not from the second but not from the first either; from neither of them does she collect anything.
"Im natlah mizeh umizeh - tachzir" - if she collected a kesubah, produce or depreciation from either of them, she must return the money. And there is one small exception: whatever she took from the second husband before the first one appeared is not taken back from her.
"V'havlad mamzer mizeh umizeh" - the child born to her from the second man is a mamzer by Torah law, and even before the first husband appeared, since by Torah law she is still a married woman. And even if the first husband, to whom she was married by Torah law, took her back and did so unlawfully - the child is a mamzer by rabbinic law, for the Sages declared him a mamzer. And when is this so? When he took her back before she received a get from the second man; but if the second man divorced her and afterward the first took her back, even though it is forbidden to do so, the child is not a mamzer.
Further laws that follow from this:
"V'lo zeh v'zeh mitamei lah" - neither of the husbands, if he is a kohen, becomes tamei for her at her death; they are not considered married to her to that extent.
"V'lo zeh v'zeh zaka'in bim'tzi'asah uv'ma'aseh yadeha uv'hafaras nedareha" - neither of them is entitled to her found objects, which a husband normally acquires; nor to the earnings of her handiwork, whose value goes to the husband; nor can he annul her vows, the way a husband annuls them.
"Haysah bas Yisrael - nifselah min hakehunah" - because of the relationship with the second husband she becomes a zonah and is disqualified from marrying a kohen.
"Uvas Levi - min hama'aser" - she does not eat maaser. This is nothing but a penalty and punishment established for this case.
"Uvas kohen - min haterumah" - she is disqualified from eating Terumah, and even rabbinic Terumah, because she became a zonah through the forbidden relationship.
"V'ein yorshin shel zeh v'yorshin shel zeh yorshin kesubasah" - the reference here is to the concept of "kesubas benin dichrin." One of the conditions of the kesubah is that if a woman dies during her husband's lifetime and left him male children, and that husband married another woman and had children from her - the estate is not divided equally; rather, each of the sons first inherits his own mother's kesubah, and only the remainder is divided equally among the sons. In this way each son takes the amount of his mother's kesubah, since one kesubah may be larger than another. This enactment was meant to encourage fathers to give a generous dowry to their daughters, knowing that their money would reach their daughter's descendants and not the sons of another woman. In the case before us kesubas benin dichrin does not apply; rather, the estate is divided among the heirs, and this is part of the fact that she has no kesubah.
"Meisu - echav shel zeh v'echav shel zeh choltzin v'lo m'yabmin" - if both husbands died, their brothers, who would ordinarily perform yibum, perform chalitzah only and do not perform yibum under these circumstances.
The dissenting opinions:
Rabbi Yose says: "Kesubasah al nichsei ba'alah harishon" - in his view she does have a kesubah, and she collects it from the property of her first husband.
Rabbi Elazar says: "Harishon zakai bim'tzi'asah uv'ma'aseh yadeha uv'hafaras nedareha" - the first husband is entitled to her found objects, to the earnings of her handiwork, and to the power to annul her vows.
Rabbi Shimon says: "Bi'asah o chalitzasah me'achiv shel rishon poteres tzarasah" - the yibum or chalitzah performed by the brother of the first husband exempts her co-wife, since this yibum is a full yibum, and that aspect of the first marriage remains in force. "V'ein havlad mimenu mamzer" - even regarding the law stated by the first tanna, that if the first husband took her back before she received a get from the second the child is a mamzer by rabbinic law, Rabbi Shimon does not hold this way.
"Im niseis shelo bir'shus":
Everything said until now was stated regarding a woman who remarried on the testimony of a single witness. Such a marriage requires the permission of beis din, since it is an exceptional dispensation and a leniency that they permitted her to remarry on the basis of one witness. And now the mishnah says: "Niseis shelo bir'shus" - when can a woman remarry without the permission of beis din? When two valid witnesses came and testified that her husband had died. In such a case there is no need for the consent of beis din, since throughout the entire Torah two witnesses are believed, and this is therefore a marriage without the explicit permission of beis din, which she does not require at all.
"Muteres lachzor lo" - she is permitted to return to her first husband, since she was entirely under duress: she had no choice in the matter, she did not err and she did not fail to investigate sufficiently, but rather she was permitted to rely on the two witnesses. Therefore, when her first husband appeared, she returns to him, and the marriage to the second is regarded as though it never took place.
In summary: in this mishnah we learned the law of a woman who remarried on the testimony of a single witness and whose husband then returned: she must leave both, she requires a get from both, and she is penalized regarding her kesubah, produce, support and depreciation, regarding the husband's rights, and regarding her eligibility for the kehunah, for maaser and for Terumah; the child is a mamzer from both, and their brothers perform chalitzah and not yibum. We noted the dissenting opinions of Rabbi Yose, Rabbi Elazar and Rabbi Shimon, and the distinction between a marriage with the permission of beis din on the testimony of one witness and a marriage on the testimony of two witnesses - in which case she was under duress and is permitted to return to her first husband.