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Gittin Chapter 4, Mishnah 4: Captured Slaves and Tikkun Olam

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Mishnah 4 in the fourth chapter of Maseches Gittin continues the series of mishnayos dealing with enactments the Sages instituted mipnei tikkun ha'olam, for the betterment of the world - enactments designed for the good of society and its proper order. Two cases are discussed in this mishnah, and both deal with a slave who left his master's domain.

A slave who was taken captive and redeemed by someone else:

The mishnah opens: "Eved shenishbah" - a slave who was taken captive by his captors, whether by an army or by non-Jewish bandits, and his Jewish master despaired of ever getting him back into his possession. "Ufda'o" - a third party, another Jew, came along and redeemed him from his captors. The question is what the slave's status is from here on, and the answer depends on the intention of the one who redeemed him:

  • "Im leshem eved - yishtabed" - if he redeemed him in order to keep him as a slave for himself, the slave now serves the one who redeemed him. Even though he was stolen from another Jew, since that master despaired of him and the slave passed from hand to hand, the redeemer may keep him for himself.

  • "Im leshem ben chorin - lo yishtabed" - if he redeemed him in order to free him, he is enslaved to no one: not to his first master, who despaired of him, and not to the one who redeemed him, since he redeemed him in order that he be a free man.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees and says: "Bein kach uvein kach yishtabed" - whether he redeemed him for the sake of slavery or for the sake of freedom, the slave returns to serve his original master. The reason is stated explicitly in the mishnah: "Shelo yehei kol echad ve'echad holech umapil es atzmo legayasos" - so that a slave should not be given an opportunity and a temptation to throw himself into the hands of captors in order to extricate himself from his master's control. For this reason he is returned to his original master in every case.

Nevertheless, regarding the money there is a difference that depends on the intention of the redeemer:

  • He redeemed him for the sake of slavery: the original master must reimburse the redeemer for the money he laid out for the redemption.

  • He redeemed him for the sake of freedom: the redeemer relinquished his money and gave it for that purpose, and therefore there is no need to compensate him.

A slave who was made an apotiki and was freed:

The second case is entirely different: a master borrowed money from another person, and designated his slave as security and a guarantee for the repayment of the loan. He said to the lender: from here you will collect your debt - by taking this slave into your ownership and possession. This is what is called an apotiki: the place from which the payment will come. According to halachah he is permitted to do this.

However, the borrowing master freed the slave for some reason. He was entitled to do so, for although he had designated him as future payment for the loan, at this moment the slave was still his and it was his right to free him. With this act of emancipation the master completely undermined the arrangement he had made with the lender.

The mishnah rules: "Shuras hadin" - by strict law, "ein ha'eved chayav klum", and the slave who was freed owes the lender nothing. "Ela mipnei tikkun ha'olam" - and here the principle of tikkun ha'olam comes into play. The concern is that the lender may find the freed slave in the marketplace and say to him: "You are my slave, for you were the payment for my loan" - and this would cast a blemish on the freed man's liberty and status.

Therefore "kofin es rabo ve'oseh oso ben chorin" - we compel the second master, namely the lender, who was supposed to take the slave into his possession, to give him a document of emancipation and free him completely. And even though by strict law the slave is not in his ownership at all, there is nonetheless an appearance of the matter here, and therefore he is obligated to free him.

"Vechoseiv shtar al damav" - the slave writes a promissory note for his own value, since at present he has no money, and in this document he obligates himself to pay in due time to the lender - that same lender for whom the slave served as an apotiki and a guarantee - the amount of his value, for with this he has acquired his freedom.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees with the first Tanna and says: "Eino kosev ela meshachrer" - it is not the slave who writes the document for his value, but rather the one who freed him, that is, the first master who borrowed the money in the first place and then freed him. He is the one who must write a document to the lender in which he obligates himself for the value of the slave, for this was part of the original arrangement between them, in which he became obligated to him for money in exchange for the loan he received.

In summary: in this mishnah we learned two cases in which the Sages instituted enactments mipnei tikkun ha'olam. Regarding a slave who was taken captive, whose master despaired of him and whom another person redeemed, the first Tanna - who distinguishes between redeeming him for the sake of slavery and redeeming him for the sake of freedom - and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, who returns him to his first master in every case so that no slave will throw himself into the hands of captors, disagree. And regarding a slave who was made an apotiki and whose master freed him, even though by strict law the slave owes nothing, we compel the lender to free him with a document, so that no blemish be cast on his freedom, and the Tannaim disagree as to who writes the document for his value: the slave or the one who freed him.